America Has Become an Unreliable Friend—Rethinking Japan’s Security as Washington Demands More Money

Japan pays part of the cost of stationing U.S. forces in the country through Host Nation Support, commonly nicknamed the “sympathy budget” in Japan.

Washington is now demanding a substantial increase. That is hardly surprising under the Trump administration.

It is called sympathy, yet the other side specifies the amount. That is a rather strange form of sympathy.

Against this background, I watched a popular YouTube military commentator speak about Japan’s security before the National Diet, Japan’s parliament.

He is known for speaking quite frankly without trying to please politicians.

What stayed with me most was his view of Japan’s relationship with the United States.

America is becoming an unreliable friend.

I thought this phrase captured the problem in the current Japan-U.S. relationship very well.

Will America Protect Japan Forever?

For many years, Japan’s security policy has been built on the assumption of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

But Americans continue to ask why their taxes should pay to defend other countries.

If Japan is attacked, how seriously will the United States actually fight for it?

The existence of a treaty does not automatically determine every action America will take.

The military commentator offered an interesting approach.

For nuclear deterrence, Japan would continue relying on the United States for roughly the next 50 years.

For defense using conventional forces, however, Japan should aim to take primary responsibility itself.

In other words, Japan should not abandon its alliance with America. It should reconsider the assumption that America will always come to its rescue.

Defending Japan Alone Would Also Be Difficult

That said, it would not be easy for Japan to confront the major military powers in its region by itself.

This is where military cooperation with countries such as South Korea and Australia becomes important.

Japan and South Korea frequently clash over historical issues. In security, however, emotion and practical interests need to be considered separately.

Information sharing, joint exercises, and coordinated logistics could gradually reduce Japan’s dependence on the United States.

The same applies to cooperation with Australia.

Creating an organization in Asia identical to NATO would probably be difficult. Even so, expanding the areas in which countries can cooperate is more rational than having each country defend itself in isolation.

A System That Can Actually Defend Japan, Not Just More “Sympathy”

Another important question is how defense money is spent.

Buying expensive weapons from the United States means little if Japan cannot maintain them or secure the necessary supplies and ammunition.

Japan also needs to preserve its domestic defense industry and build the capacity to sustain military operations over the long term.

Paying America more and improving Japan’s own defense capability are not the same thing.

Of course, there is value in paying the costs required to maintain the Japan-U.S. alliance.

But no amount of money can purchase a guarantee that America will always come to Japan’s aid.

What I found interesting in this discussion was its realistic distance from America: neither treating the United States as an enemy nor trusting it unconditionally.

Rely on it for nuclear deterrence. Increase self-reliance in conventional defense. Deepen cooperation with South Korea and Australia.

Being allies does not mean Japan must leave everything to the United States.

Remain friends, but stop handing over the keys to your house.

That may be the kind of relationship Japan and America need from now on.

After all, Japan shows a considerable amount of “sympathy” every year.

Perhaps it is time for America to show Japan a little sympathy in return.