Even If Nuclear Weapons Cannot Be Used, They Can Still Be Used to Threaten—A Military Analyst’s Point Frightened Me

The other day, I listened to a military analyst discussing the war in Ukraine, and what he said frightened me a little.

He was talking about nuclear weapons.

Russia is unlikely to use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine. Doing so would provoke an overwhelming reaction from the West and have irreversible consequences for Russia itself.

I already understood that much.

But the analyst’s point went one step further.

Being unable to actually use a nuclear weapon and threatening to use one are two entirely different things.

Of course. Once he said it, the point seemed obvious.

And the more I thought about it, the more disturbing it became.

Could Nuclear Weapons Be One Reason the War Does Not End?

Nuclear weapons are generally said to be weapons that prevent war.

If the other side has nuclear weapons, you cannot attack it casually. If both sides fire nuclear weapons at each other, there will be no winner.

Something slightly different, however, is happening in the war in Ukraine.

Russia has nuclear weapons. As a result, although the United States and NATO support Ukraine, they remain cautious about deploying their own forces and fighting the Russian military directly.

Russia, for its part, also wants to avoid a full-scale war with NATO.

The result is a conventional war that continues without end.

I am not claiming that the war would have ended quickly if nuclear weapons did not exist. But there is no doubt that their existence limits Western military intervention.

The weapons that are supposed to prevent war have also become one of the conditions allowing a war to continue.

The irony is hard to miss.

What If Russia Were Truly Cornered?

This is the part that frightened me.

Suppose the Russian military suffered a crushing defeat on the battlefield and the Putin government found itself in danger.

It could not win through conventional warfare. Yet dropping a nuclear weapon on a Ukrainian city would invite Western military retaliation and international isolation.

So what could it do?

There is another option: demonstrate a nuclear explosion without firing a nuclear weapon at the enemy.

In other words, conduct a nuclear test.

For example, Russia could carry out an underground nuclear test on Russian territory near the Ukrainian border.

This is a hypothetical scenario, but it is frightening to imagine.

Russia would probably explain it this way:

“This was a nuclear test conducted within our own territory. We did not attack Ukraine.”

Strictly speaking, it would not have fired a nuclear weapon into Ukraine.

But if a nuclear explosion occurred just across the border, everyone would wonder the same thing:

Is this a warning that says, “Next time, we really will fire one”?

Without using a nuclear weapon in combat, Russia could create the same kind of fear as if it had.

That is what makes the idea so troublesome.

The Real Target of the Threat May Be the West

What makes the scenario even more disturbing is that Russia’s real target might not be Ukraine, but the West.

Ukraine is fighting to defend its own territory.

A nuclear test alone would probably not make it surrender.

For people in the United States and Europe, however, the situation is different.

“Are we going to be dragged into a nuclear war just to support Ukraine?”

That debate would undoubtedly begin.

If fear of nuclear war pushed Western public opinion toward reducing support for Ukraine, Russia could achieve its objective without using a nuclear weapon in combat.

Of course, the West might instead harden its position. A nuclear test would not necessarily work in Russia’s favor.

Even so, it is conceivable that a cornered state might take such a gamble.

The problem with nuclear weapons is not limited to their actual use.

The moment the other side believes that they might truly be used, they begin to function as instruments of coercion.

Nuclear Weapons Are Not Necessarily Safe Just Because They Cannot Be Used

Until now, I believed it would be difficult for Russia to actually use a nuclear weapon.

Doing so could bring about Russia’s own destruction. I therefore assumed there was also a limit to how far nuclear intimidation could go.

After listening to the military analyst, however, my thinking changed slightly.

If you cannot use a nuclear weapon, you can still frighten the other side without using it.

If verbal threats stop working, you can conceivably display a nuclear explosion under the name of a test.

Even without attacking the other side directly, fear can change its political decisions.

If Russia fires a nuclear weapon into Ukraine, it is a nuclear attack.

But if it detonates one on its own side of the border, it can insist that it was merely a nuclear test.

The terror of the nuclear explosion remains exactly the same, but apparently a single border can give it a more peaceful name.