Japan Knew It Would Lose. Why It Went to War with America Anyway
“Japan’s military ran out of control and rushed into a war against the United States that it could never have won.”
This is a common explanation of the Pacific War.
The other day, I watched a video about the Akimaru Agency.
The Akimaru Agency was an economic warfare research unit established by the Imperial Japanese Army before the war. It analyzed the economic strength and resources of Japan, the United States, Britain, and other countries, and concluded that it would be extremely difficult for Japan to win a prolonged war.
Japan went to war anyway.
In the past, this was often explained by saying that the military ignored objective analysis and launched a reckless war. According to the video, however, such a simple interpretation is less widely accepted today.
It was not that the military failed to understand the gap in national power. Japan chose war despite recognizing that its chances of victory were poor.
Why, then, would a country start a war it knew it was likely to lose?
Desperate People Buy Lottery Tickets
Imagine someone so desperate that they do not even have enough money to live on the next day.
The rational choice would be to use the little money they have left to buy food and think about how to survive afterward.
But some people use that money to buy a lottery ticket.
They know the odds of winning are extremely low. Even so, if they believe they are doomed either way, they may be tempted to gamble on the slightest chance of reversing their fortunes.
To an outside observer, it looks foolish.
But to the person involved, it is the last remaining hope.
Perhaps Japan was in a similar psychological state in 1941.
Submit to the United States or Fight a War with Little Chance of Victory
At the time, Japan had prolonged its war in China and allowed its relationship with the United States to deteriorate.
The American oil embargo created a serious problem for Japan’s continued military operations.
The Hull Note, presented after negotiations, was understood by the Japanese side as a demand to withdraw from China and fundamentally reverse its previous continental policy.
From today’s perspective, it seems only natural that Japan should have stopped invading other countries and withdrawn.
But this was also an era when Western powers maintained colonies around the world.
For Japan’s leaders, abandoning the interests acquired on the Asian continent was not merely a diplomatic concession. It also meant repudiating a national strategy pursued for years and rendering all the sacrifices already made meaningless.
The important point is that the leaders of the time regarded withdrawal as politically unacceptable.
As a result, they saw only two remaining options.
Accept the American demands and abandon the country’s strategy up to that point.
Or begin a war with little chance of victory and gamble that early military successes would lead to a favorable negotiated peace.
Japan chose the latter.
What If China Demanded Japan’s Submission Today?
Now let us consider a modern parallel.
Suppose the Japan-U.S. alliance disappeared and Japan became isolated.
Then imagine that China, possessing overwhelming military power, presented Japan with the following terms:
“Join the Chinese sphere, and your economy and security will be guaranteed. However, you must abolish democracy and the imperial institution.”
Japan would have almost no chance of winning through military resistance.
Would the Japanese people calmly conclude that they should simply submit?
Probably not so easily.
No matter how great the disparity in national power, some people would surely argue that Japan should resist rather than lose its independence and institutions as a state.
Whether a country can win and whether it can accept the alternative are separate questions.
Perhaps Japan’s leaders at the time viewed withdrawal from the Asian continent as a humiliation of similar magnitude.
Withdrawing from another country’s territory is not the same as one’s own country submitting to a foreign power. The shared psychology, however, is that what the parties define as “absolutely nonnegotiable” can eliminate otherwise rational options altogether.
Wars Happen Even When Leaders Know They Will Lose
The Akimaru Agency’s analysis suggests that prewar Japan did not lack objective information.
The problem may have been that the political situation made it impossible to translate that information into policy.
They knew they could not win, but they could not concede.
Because they could not concede, they gambled on a slim chance of victory.
And when that gamble failed, the price was paid not only by the leaders who made the decision but by the entire population.
It is easy to dismiss the war as the result of a foolish military establishment.
But doing so blinds us to the possibility that modern states may make the same kind of decision.
The truly frightening possibility is not only that ignorant leaders may start a war.
Even leaders who understand that they will lose may still choose to fight.
And unlike a lottery ticket, when a nation makes a catastrophic gamble, the people who placed the bet are not the only ones who go bankrupt.