History Is Shaped Less by Brilliant Generals Than by the Size of Their Budgets

When watching dramas set during Japan’s Sengoku period—the age of civil wars that lasted from the late fifteenth to the late sixteenth century—it is hard not to focus on the ingenuity of famous commanders and their unconventional strategies.

Take the Battle of Nagashino, for example, a major battle in 1575 in which the forces of Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu defeated the Takeda clan.

The standard account once held that Nobunaga adopted the advanced tactic of deploying firearms on a large scale and defeated a Takeda army that remained committed to cavalry.

In recent years, however, historians have reconsidered the image of the Takeda forces as an outdated army centered on mounted troops.

The Takeda were not unaware of the power of firearms. They used guns themselves.

Why, then, was it difficult for them to deploy firearms on the same scale as the combined Oda and Tokugawa forces?

This is where economic power, even before battlefield tactics, becomes important.

Buying Firearms Is Only the Beginning

Using large numbers of firearms requires a continuous supply not only of the guns themselves, but also of bullets and gunpowder.

Saltpeter, a key ingredient in gunpowder, could not be obtained domestically in sufficient quantities in Japan at the time, making overseas trade important.

Nobunaga had expanded his influence over the commercial cities and distribution networks of the Kinai region, the economic heartland around Kyoto and Osaka, putting him in a position to gather enormous quantities of supplies.

The Takeda clan, based in the inland province of Kai in present-day Yamanashi Prefecture, faced both geographical and economic constraints.

The Takeda army would surely have preferred to deploy firearms in large numbers if it could. But assembling a large arsenal, securing ammunition, and training soldiers all required money first.

No matter how brilliant a commander’s strategy may be, it cannot be executed without the necessary supplies.

The difference in the contents of their wallets had already shaped the contest before the armies met on the battlefield.

The Pacific War Had the Same Structure

The same pattern appeared in the Pacific War, the Asia-Pacific theater of World War II in which Japan fought the United States and other Allied powers from 1941 to 1945.

Discussion often focuses on the Japanese military’s reliance on fighting spirit and its operational failures.

Yet there were also many occasions when Japanese tactics were highly effective.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a bold operation involving a large carrier strike force, and the Zero fighter gave Japan major advantages in range and maneuverability early in the war.

The problem was that these strengths alone could not win a war.

With its overwhelming industrial capacity, the United States mass-produced aircraft and ships and replaced the forces it lost. Its entire system for sustaining war—from fuel, transport ships, and maintenance facilities to pilot training—was enormous.

Even when Japan developed an excellent weapon, the United States could mass-produce and deploy a countermeasure.

Superior performance in a single aircraft would eventually be overwhelmed if the other side could send several times as many.

And the problem extended beyond weapons. When experienced pilots were lost, training replacements also required time and resources.

Winning a tactical victory once and sustaining a war for years until final victory are entirely different capabilities.

Today’s US-China Rivalry Is Ultimately an Economic Question Too

Looking at the modern rivalry between the United States and China from this perspective produces a different picture.

China has a vast manufacturing sector and has rapidly expanded its military strength. For the United States, it is a competitor on an unprecedented scale.

But if we apply the economic principle described above, the winner is clear.

The United States is an important market for China, while China is also an enormous production base for the United States.

If the two countries entered a full-scale military conflict, both would suffer immense damage.

The crucial point, however, is that the meaning of that damage would be completely different for each country.

For the United States, China is one production base that can gradually be replaced. For China, the United States is not only a vast market for its products but also an important link to advanced technology and international finance.

The United States has room to restructure its economy even if it cuts ties with China. China, however, could lose not only the US market but also suffer severe damage to its relationship with the global economy itself.

For the United States, it would also be a question of living standards and economic efficiency. For China, it would become a question affecting the national economy itself.

Even if China succeeded in occupying Taiwan in the opening phase of a conflict, subsequent economic sanctions would clearly cause the Chinese economy to collapse—or at the very least cost China its current economic position.

The Real Protagonists of History Are Surprisingly Unremarkable

In historical dramas, the exciting scene is the one in which a famous general spreads out a map and devises a plan to outmaneuver the enemy.

But who procured the provisions, who manufactured the weapons, and who paid the transportation costs needed to carry out that plan? Those parts are rarely shown.

That is understandable. A protagonist staring at ledgers and worrying about cash flow would be far too dull for a drama.

In real warfare, however, those unremarkable details are precisely what determine victory or defeat.

The commanders who devise strategies are remembered by history, but those strategies are usually made possible by accountants and logistics officers whose names are never recorded.